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1 Introduction
Household inflation expectations play a key role in models of consumption decisions and the real
effects of monetary policy, yet little is know about how these expectations are formed. In recent
years, a growing empirical literature provides evidence about how individuals use information to
form their inflation expectations. For example, in Cavallo, Cruces and Perez-Truglia (2014) we
show that individuals learn from inflation statistics and from prices of individual goods, and that
they are more attentive in countries with higher inflation. In this paper, we use data from a period
of manipulated official statistics in Argentina to study in more depth the degree of sophistication
of this learning process, as well as the role of trust and perceived biases in the information used
to form inflation expectations.
We study how people learn -in a Bayesian sense- in an environment that combines a great deal
of interest in learning about inflation, with a large number of alternative inflation statistics, some of
which are biased by the government. We find that consumers are sophisticated users of information.
Rather than simply ignoring the official statistics or taking them at face value, households seem
to effectively adjust for the perceived bias using other available information. Furthermore, the
publication of biased statistics may have lead to an asymmetric reaction to inflation signals (even
unbiased ones), with expectations changing more when inflation rose than when it fell.
Our findings are based on both observational and experimental evidence obtained during the
recent period of manipulation of inflation statistics in Argentina, from 2007 to 2015. This was
an ideal setting for several reasons. First, the inflation rate fluctuated between 15% and 30%,
implicating that the costs of inattention are high, so people spent a great deal of time gathering
and processing information about the inflation rate.1 Second, there is ample evidence that the
official sources of inflation information, such as the official CPI, were biased (for a discussion of
the evidence, see Cavallo, 2013).2 Third, the lack of reliable official data promoted the creation of
a large number of alternative inflation indicators during this period, thereby potentially allowing
individuals to counter-react to the government manipulation by using other data.
We start with some observational data on the co-movement of inflation expectations and several
alternative inflation statistics before and after the intervention of the National Statistics Institute
(INDEC), when the government started reporting official statistics that were systematically below
the unofficial estimates. Inflation expectations quickly diverged from official inflation levels and
closely tracked those in unofficial indicators. This suggests that consumers are not naive learners
who process manipulated official statistics as if they were not biased. However, this observational
1Since they cannot write contracts in foreign currency or indexed by inflation, households needed to constantly
estimate inflation to sign rent contracts, negotiate wages, and make savings and investment decisions. Indeed,
inflation statistics were frequently mentioned and discussed in the front pages of newspapers and other media outlets,
and opinion polls systematically indicated that inflation was perceived as one of the most important problems in
the country.
2Our analysis extends the account of the main events from 2006 until December 2015, when a new government
finally suspended the publication of the official CPI.
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evidence presents two challenges. First, it is not conclusive because we do not observe the relevant
counter-factual - i.e., the distribution of household expectations in the absence of information about
biased official statistics. Second, the evidence is silent about the nature of the learning process,
such as whether individuals were simply ignoring the official statistics or adjusting in some other
way to them.
To address these limitations with the observational data, we provide a simple model of Bayesian
learners with potentially-biased statistics, and we designed a survey experiment to test its predic-
tions. The model shows that, far from ignoring official statistics, rational learners should react
to changes in official statistics by “de-biasing” the signal based on their perceived bias, while at
the same time updating their beliefs about the size of the official bias. In other words, rational
consumers are expected to extract useful information contained in potentially-biased information.
We ran a large-scale survey experiment in Argentina in December 2012 to test this prediction.
The experiment consisted in providing respondents with different estimates of inflation, and mea-
suring how these pieces of information affected their subsequent inflation perceptions, inflation
expectations, and their confidence in these beliefs. The large variety of inflation indicators avail-
able at the time meant that we could cross-randomize in a non-deceptive way two features of the
message provided to subjects: the source of the inflation statistics (official and unofficial) and the
level of the inflation rate (10%, 20%, or 30%).
Our experimental evidence rejects the hypothesis that individuals simply ignore the information
coming from biased official statistics. People’s perceptions reacted significantly to all signals,
including official sources of inflation. For example, relative to individuals who were told that the
official inflation rate was 20%, individuals who were told that it was 10% reported lower inflation
perceptions and expectations; and individuals who were told that official inflation rate was 30%
reported higher inflation perceptions and expectations.
The reaction to unofficial and official statistics also confirmed the perception of the bias in
the official data. Since the official statistics had been consistently 10 percentage points below the
unofficial estimates, our Bayesian model would predict that individuals should react to a signal
that official inflation is 10% in the same way that they would react to a signal that unofficial
inflation is 20%; and they should react to an official inflation of 20% equally than to an unofficial
inflation of 30%. This implies that people were not only reacting to the official information, but
also effectively “de-biasing” it in a rational, sophisticated way.
The experiment also allowed us to explore a seemingly asymmetric reaction of inflation ex-
pectations to inflation signals seen in the observational data (expectations reacted more to actual
inflation during periods when inflation was rising than when it was falling). Relative to individuals
who were told that unofficial inflation was 20%, individuals who were told that unofficial inflation
was 10% had on average lower inflation perceptions by a significant 2.31 percentage points; and
individuals who were told that unofficial inflation was 30% had on average higher inflation percep-
tions by a significant 5.86 percentage points. This evidence suggests that individuals were nearly
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twice as reactive to information about higher inflation than to information about lower inflation.3
In a related paper, Cavallo, Cruces and Perez-Truglia (2014), we show that individuals do
not only form inflation expectations using information from aggregate statistics, but they also
put significant weight on their perceptions about prices of individual supermarket products. This
implies that the government could try to influence inflation expectations by changing the actual
prices of salient products. Indeed, in an effort to curb inflation, in 2013 the Argentine government
froze the prices of a relatively large and important sample of consumer products (with large
weights in the CPI basket and sold by retailers with big market shares). We show that even
though the inflation rate fell substantially, household inflation expectations did not fall. We ran
a price-elicitation survey outside a large supermarket chain in Argentina during the time of the
price controls to test whether consumers were noticing the slowdown in prices. Consistent with the
observational data, we found that even though there was a substantial difference in the actual price
changes between goods that were under price controls and those that were not, such difference was
not perceived by consumers and it did not affect their expectations of inflation.
While the context of manipulated statistics in Argentina is an extreme case, these results
are also informative about how individuals learn from inflation data in other countries. Even in
developed nations, a significant share of individuals do not trust official statistics. According to
data from Eurobarometer (2008), even though 69% of respondents in Europe considered that it was
necessary to know about economic indicators, only 46% stated that they tended to trust official
statistics such as the growth rate, the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. Among U.S. survey
respondents, 27% rated their trust in official statistics 4 or lower on a 1-10 scale (Curtin, 2009).
Analysts, commentators and the media routinely discuss the possibility of manipulated statistics,
such as around the job creation data released right before the 2012 election in the United States.4
In Cavallo et al. (2014) we found that 32% of U.S. survey respondents say that they do not trust
inflation statistics and have inflation expectations that are 50% higher on average. In addition to
inattention, part of the reason why household do not seem to fully incorporate information from
inflation statistics (Mankiw et al., 2003; Carroll, 2003) may be that individuals do not fully trust
the data provided by the government.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study how individuals learn from
manipulated statistics. More generally, the study of biased statistics goes back to the seminal
contribution by Morgenstern (1963) on measurement, accuracy and uncertainty in economics.
Morgenstern’s book discusses how both private companies and governments have strong incentives
to manipulate information, including a chapter about the problems of measuring prices and price
changes.5 More recently, some papers have used data to measure the degree of bias in official
3The absolute difference between these effects (2.31 and 5.86) is statistically significant (p-value=0.06).
4See Norris, Floyd. 2014. “Doubting the Economic Data? Consider the Source.” The New York Times,
November 6. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/business/economy/doubting-the-economic-data-consider-the-
source.html.
5Morgenstern also covers the difficulties of measuring the national product, and in fact Argentina’s government
5
statistics, including examples such as inflation in Argentina (Cavallo, 2013), the manipulation of
debt indicators in Greece (Rauch et al., 2011), and alternative estimates of growth and inflation in
China (Nakamura et al, 2014). Michalski and Stoltz (2013), in turn, use statistical regularities in
economic indicators to suggest that countries seem to manipulate economic data systematically.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature about the formation of household economic
expectations. In particular, it is widely recognized that identifying the formation of inflation
expectations is important to understand the link between the nominal and real sides of the economy
(Bernanke, 2007; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2013). A number of studies provide evidence that
inflation statistics play a significant role in driving inflation expectations, including the analysis of
variation in media coverage of statistics (Lamla and Lein, 2008; Badarinza and Buchmann, 2009;
Drager, 2011), quasi-experimental variation in reporting official statistics (Carrillo and Emran,
2012) and information-provision experiments (Roos and Schmidt, 2012; Armantier et al., 2012a;
Cavallo, Cruces and Perez-Truglia, 2014).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the period of manipulation of official statis-
tics in Argentina and presents the observational evidence using the time series of inflation expec-
tations and a set of inflation indicators (both official and private). Section 3 presents a simple
model of Bayesian learning from manipulated statistics, the design of the survey experiment and
its results. In Section 4 we discuss the period of price controls in 2013. The last sections concludes.
2 Manipulation of Inflation Statistics in Argentina
2.1 The Intervention of the National Statistical Institute (INDEC)
After a severe economic crisis in 2001-2002, the Argentine economy started to recover in 2003
mostly due to an unprecedented increase in commodity prices. Inflation levels were relatively low
at the beginning of the recovery, but reached double digits in 2005 (12.3% per year). During
2006 the government imposed a series of price controls and organized public boycotts against some
retailers. The government also started to pressure the professional staff at the National Statistics
Institute (INDEC) to make methodological changes that could lower the annual inflation rate. For
example, they were asked to reveal the identities of the stores where the data was being collected,
introduce automatic substitutions to reduce the weight of items that had higher inflation, and use
prices from price-control lists even if those goods were not available for sale at the stores where the
data was collected. In February 2007, facing a second year of inflation above 10% and unwilling to
scale back its expansionary policies, the government took a drastic decision to intervene INDEC
and fire key high-ranking members of the staff, including Graciela Bevacqua, the statistician in
charge of the team that computed the CPI. The monthly inflation rate, which in January 2006
also falsified INDEC’s GDP indicator (Camacho et al., 2015), for political reasons and to avoid the payment of a
GDP warrant (a bond that only paid debtors if GDP grows at a certain rate).
6
had been 1.1%, immediately fell to 0.4% in February and continued with a similar trend in the
following months. The annual inflation rate fell below 10% and gradually started to fall. As
the old employees of INDEC started to publicly disclose what had happened in previous months,
the suspicions of a manipulation of the CPI steadily grew. INDEC stopped publishing some
dissagregated inflation series and announced “methodological changes” that were never publicly
disclosed. Figure 1 provides a time-line of the most important events from 2006 to 2015, when the
manipulation of the CPI finally ended.
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Figure 1: Time-line of the Manipulation of Inflation Statistics in Argentina
Feb 2006 • The Secretary of Interior Commerce, Guillermo Moreno, tries to gain access to micro data protected
by statistical confidentiality laws
Oct 2006 • Moreno hires a market-research firm “Tomadato”, to produce an alternative CPI
Jan 2007 • The director of the INDEC announces that Paglieri, Moreno’s assistant, will be visiting the insti-
tution for one month to check the last estimations
• First meeting with Paglieri and the directors of the INDEC
• Paglieri decides to stop the publication of CPI-GBA
• Bevacqua, the director of the Prices Departmen is suspended
Feb 2007 • The government officially intervenes INDEC
• The first manipulated CPI-GBA monthly index is published
• Bevacqua is officially fired and replaced by Paglieri
• First mobilization of the INDEC employees takes place (repeated every month since)
• Senators from the opposition ask a federal prosecutor to intervene
Mar 2007 • The director of INDEC, Leilo Marmora, resigns.
May 2007 • Garrido, a federal prosecutor, says serious irregularities took place at INDEC
Jul 2007 • Cynthia Pok, in charge of the "National Household Survey", is fired
• First official strike of the INDEC employees
Sep 2007 • The INDEC modifies Mendoza province’s inflation rate before publication
• The calculation of the CPI-Nacional is changed
Dec 2007 • Cristina Kirchner becomes the president of Argentina, succeeding her husband.
Jan 2008 • INDEC employees receive wage cuts
March 2008 • Launch of‘www.inflationverdadera.com”, a website were alternative indicators using online prices
are updated on a daily basis. The inflation rate is three times higher than in CPI estimates.
May 2008 • INDEC stops publishing the CPI-Nacional, an index that used price data from 7 provinces
• INDEC announces new CPI weights. Food becomes more important in the new index.
• Some employees of INDEC are physically assaulted by government supporters at the Finance
Ministry building
Nov 2010 • The government announces an agreement with the IMF for the normalization of the statistics
Feb 2011 • Moreno asks private consultants to share the methodology of their CPI calculations. Most of them
refuse.
Mar 2011 • Some private consultants are fined with 500.000 pesos for failing to comply with Moreno’s request
May 2011 • The “CPI Congreso” (an average of private consultants’ inflation rates) is born
• A judge rejects the fines imposed on private consultants
Sep 2011 • Private consultants receive letters from the goverment threatening them with criminal prosecutions
if they continue to publish their own inflation estimates
Feb 2012 • The IMF announces that Argentina did not improve the CPI-GBA according to the international
rules
• The Economist stops publishing Argentina’s official statistics and uses instead the index produced
by PriceStats (a company working with the Billion Prices Project at MIT)
Feb 2013 • The IMF issues a “motion of censure” against Argentina for the bad quality statistics
• Moreno is replaced by Augusto Costa as Secretary of Interior Commerce
Jan 2014 • The CPI-GBA is replaced by a new index, called CPI-Nu. It initially shows similar monthly
inflation rates to unofficial estimates, but starts to diverge once again within a few months.
Apr 2014 • The government announces that the official poverty index will no longer be published
Dec 2015 • Mauricio Macri, a member of the opposition, becomes the new president of Argentina
• Jorge Todesca became the director and Bevacqua returns as the technical director of INDEC
• Todesca says that INDEC is like a “scorched earth” and suspends the publication of the CPI and
other price indexes
Jan 2016 • Bevacqua announces that it will take 8 month for the INDEC to publish a new CPI.
Notes: Compiled by the authors from newspaper articles and other sources.
2.2 Unofficial Inflation Statistics
The unusual situation with INDEC led to a proliferation of alternative measures of inflation, that
we refer to generally as “Unofficial” Inflation indicators. The main alternative indicator we use
is computed by PriceStats, a private firm based in the US that uses online prices from large
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retailers since 2007. This index is currently published by The Economist magazine every week.6A
second alternative indicator published since 2008 is produced by “Buenos Aires City” (BAC), a
think tank lead by Graciela Bevacqua (the head of INDEC’s CPI team that was fired by the
government in 2007). BAC uses prices collected from a sample of products in the City of Buenos
Aires and follows the old INDEC methodology.7 A third unofficial indicator is the “Provincial
Index”, based on the Consumer Price Indexes from nine Argentine provinces. While the official
national index by INDEC was historically based on the Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) area only,
provincial statistical agencies also collected regional price data and computed their own CPIs.
The federal government pressured the provinces to stop publishing those indexes or to manipulate
those in turn, but provinces not aligned with the federal government continued disseminating their
own un-adulterated data. This index is computed by “CqP” as a geometric weighted mean of
nine provincial CPIs for the post-2006 period, with weights computed to maximize the correlation
between the provincial aggregate and the official (GBA-based) index during the pre-manipulation
period. Finally, the “Congress Average” Index is an average of private inflation indicators that
started to be widely cited in the media in 2011, after the government started to fine and prosecute
economists that were publishing their own unofficial inflation estimates. Some members of Congress
from the opposition, who are immune from prosecution, started compiling and publishing a monthly
average of “private” estimates. There were other alternative indicators that were also publicly
available. In the Appendix we provide a comprehensive list with details on their methodologies
and main characteristics.
6PriceStats is a private company connected with the Billion Prices Project at MIT, an academic initiative
created in 2008 by Alberto Cavallo (an author in this paper) and Roberto Rigobon to experiment with the use of
online data in the production of price indices and other macro and international research applications. See Cavallo
& Rigobon (2016) for more details on the Billion Prices Project.
7See Bevacqua and Salvatore (2009) for details.
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Figure 2: Official Inflation and Alternative Unofficial Indicators, 2004-2013
0
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Official Inflation Rate Unofficial Inflation (Pricestats)
Unofficial Inflation (Provincial Index) Unofficial Inflation (BA City)
Unofficial Inflation (Congress Average) (All: Previous 12 Months)
Notes: The vertical line represents the start of the intervention of the national statistical agency (INDEC) in
January 2007. “Official Inflation” is the annual inflation rate reported by INDEC. The underlying Consumer
Price Index is based on a sample of prices from the Greater Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area (GBA). We
present in this Figure a series of unofficial inflation rate estimates: a) “Unofficial Inflation (PricesStats)” is an
indicator compiled by PriceStats LLC based on prices from online retailers (derived from the MIT’s Billion
Prices Project; see Cavallo, 2013, for more details). b) “Unofficial Inflation (Provincial Index)” is based on a
geometric average of nine provincial statistical agencies’ Consumer Price Indexes (source: CqP). c) “Unofficial
Inflation (BA City)” is computed by Buenos Aires City from a sample of products and prices from the GBA
area, following INDEC’s traditional methodology (the two series coincide until September 2006). d) “Unofficial
Rate (Congress Average)”: an average of several unofficial indicators compiled by Congress representatives
from opposition parties. All inflation indicators are monthly series.
The annual inflation rate for all these unofficial indicators and the official CPI are shown
in Figure 2. The vertical line shows the month of the intervention at INDEC. The official and
unofficial indicators started to diverge immediately. All the unofficial indicators showed similar
results, despite their differences in the sources of data and methodologies. On average, the inflation
rate in the unofficial indicators was approximately 10 percentage points higher than in the official
data.
2.3 Inflation Expectations and Inflation Statistics
The surge in inflation during 2006 motivated a renewed interest in the measurement of household
expectations. In August 2006, the “Centro de Investigación en Finanzas” at the Torcuato Di Tella
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University started to conduct a national survey of inflation expectations, published on a monthly
basis.
Figure 3: Official Statistics, Unofficial Statistics and Inflation Expectations, 2006-2013
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Notes: The vertical line represents the start of the intervention of the national statistical agency (INDEC) in
January 2007. “Official Inflation” is the annual inflation rate reported by INDEC. The “Unofficial Inflation”
indicator is computed by PriceStats (see notes in Figure 2 for more details). The mean of inflation expectations
for the following 12 months are quarterly averages of the monthly series from the Encuesta de Expectativas
de Inflación (carried out since August 2006 by the Centro de Investigación en Finanzas, Universidad Torcuato
Di Tella). This survey collected information on the inflation expectations for the following 12 months among
the general population of Argentina, based on a standard question for this type of survey (“What do you
expect the annual rate of inflation will be during the next 12 months?”).
In Figure 3, we plot the official inflation rate, our main unofficial inflation indicator (PriceStats),
and the mean inflation expectation from the household survey.8 These monthly time series allows
us to study the co-evolution of the available inflation indicators and of inflation expectations for a
seven year period of uninterrupted manipulation of official statistics.
Household inflation expectations closely tracked the unofficial level of inflation over time. The
match is surprising in 2007 because the PriceStats index was not publicly available at the time
(an early version of that index started to be published in a website called inflacionverdadera.com
in March 2008). There were, however, other unofficial estimates reported in newspaper articles
8In Figure 3 we report quarterly averages of the mean and the median of inflation expectations to minimize the
noise in the series.
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during that time. In the Appendix we plot the annual inflation rates mentioned in these articles
and show that they co-move with inflation expectations during 2007.
There is also some evidence of an asymmetric behavior in the response of expectations to the
actual inflation rate. There are two periods, in particular, were expectations seem stickier on the
way down. First, in 2009, when the country was experiencing the effects of the global financial
crisis. Second, in 2013, when the unofficial inflation rate fell again due to both significant price
controls and another recession. These trends suggest that manipulating inflation statistics actually
made things worse from the point of view of curbing inflation expectations. One possibility is that
the proliferation of unofficial indicators may have increased the uncertainty regarding which sources
were reliable, particularly in 2013 when some of the unofficial indicators temporarily diverged.
Another possibility is that individuals started to rely more on their own memories about price
changes, which have been shown to have a substantial positive bias (see Cavallo et al., 2014). We
discuss some of these options in Section 4, where we focus on the inflation slowdown of 2013.
3 Experimental Evidence with Aggregate Statistics
The patterns that emerge from the time series in the previous section support the hypothesis that
households are not naive learners who believe in the official data. However, we cannot make causal
inferences from this observational data, and it is unclear whether individuals are simply ignoring
the official data or adjusting to it in a rational way. To address these limitations, this section
develops a Bayesian learning model of inflation expectations in the presence of biased signals, and
use experimental evidence to test some of its predictions.
3.1 A Model of Learning with Biased Statistics
This section provides a model of Bayesian learning in presence of potentially-biased statistics.
For the sake of simplicity, we study the static case where the inflation rate is fixed at πactual and
an individual must learn about that rate of inflation indirectly from a series of signals. We also
assume that price changes for each individual product in the economy are normally distributed ,
with mean πactual and variance is given by σ2actual, and that the variance is known to the individual.
Relaxing these assumptions would complicate the algebra but would not change the main intuition
of the model.
The individual can observe two signals based on the information about the price changes for the
individual products. The first signal comes from the price changes for a randomly-drawn subset of
Nu products, with an associated mean u¯ and variance 1Nuσ
2
actual. This signal could be an unbiased
unofficial inflation index or represent the information that individuals obtain by using averages of
their own memories about price changes over a set of products (Bates and Gabor, 1986; Bruine
de Bruin et al., 2011; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2013; Cavallo et al., 2014). The second signal
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is the government’s official statistics. We assume the government also takes a randomly-drawn
subset of No products and computes its average price change, producing a signal with associated
mean o¯ and variance 1
No
σ2actual. However, the government does not report o¯ but adds instead a
bias, bactual, before reporting it. In other words, the government reports o¯Í = o¯+ bactual instead of
o¯. Note that Nu and No determine the precision of the unofficial and official signals. To simplify
notation, we will replace for σ2u = 1Nuσ
2
actual and σ2o = 1Noσ
2
actual. In practice, σ2u and σ2o represents
not only a pure statistical error driven by sample size, but also other sources of error. For example,
individuals may perceive σ2o to be high because they do not understand how precise these statistics
are or because they do not believe that these statistics are representative of their own consumption
bundle. Similarly, σ2u may take into account the individual’s imprecision in remembering historical
prices. See Cavallo et al. (2014) for evidence of these two options.
The individual has two beliefs: one about the inflation rate, π, and another about the govern-
ment bias, b. We denote π0 as the belief of the inflation rate prior to obtaining new information,
and π1 as the belief of the inflation rate after doing so, while bo and b1 are similarly defined.
The normality assumption about the distribution of price changes determines that the conjugate
distribution for beliefs about inflation and bias is bi-variate normal. For the sake of notational
simplicity, we focus on the case where the prior beliefs for the inflation rate and the bias are
orthogonal. In the Appendix B.3 we show that under these assumption we obtain the following
equations for the posterior beliefs:
π1 = (1− ω1 − ω2)π0 + ω1u¯+ ω2 (o¯Í − b0) (1)
b1 = (1− ψ1 − ψ2) b0 + ψ1 (o¯Í − π0) + ψ2 (o¯Í − u¯) (2)
The mean posterior belief for the inflation rate, π1, is a weighted average between the mean
prior belief, π0, the unofficial inflation rate, u¯, and the bias-adjusted official statistics, o¯Í− b0. The
mean posterior belief for the government bias, b1, is a weighted average between the prior belief,
b0, the gap between the official statistics and the prior belief about inflation, o¯Í − π0, and the gap
between the official statistics and the unofficial statistics, o¯Í− u¯. The parameters ω1, ω2, ψ1, and ψ2
are weights that depend on the precision of the signals and prior beliefs. Details for these weights
are provided in the Appendix.
The most important prediction of this model is that a Bayesian learner is not expected to ignore
biased statistics, but instead rationally adjust to the perceived bias. The following two scenarios
are useful to understand the intuition of the model.
A first scenario explores how an individual who starts thinking that the government is not lying
reacts to an official signal that is different to its prior. In particular, consider an individual that
starts with b0 = 0 and gets signals u¯ = π0 (the unofficial signal equals the prior) and o¯Í < π0 (the
official signal is lower than the prior). The individual can attribute the low level of the official
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statistic to a bias or believe that is driven by sampling variation. How fast would the individual
learn about a bias? By making the relevant replacements in the above formula for b1 we get that
b1 = (ψ1 + ψ2) (o¯Í − π0). The term ψ1 + ψ2 is a set of weights that increases with the precision of
both the official and unofficial signals. So, for example, if the individual perceived that there is
a lot of measurement error in either of those signals, she would not change so rapidly her belief
about a bias in the official data.
A second scenario explores how an individual who believes that the government is manipulating
statistics reacts to the official statistics relative to the unofficial statistics. In the data, this will be
studied by means of a series of information experiments during the period of manipulated statistics.
Consider an individual that starts out thinking that the government biases the inflation statistics
downwards: i.e., b0 < 0. How does the individual react to official statistics relative to unofficial
statistics? From the formula for π1 it follows that the individual reacts to o¯Í almost the same as it
reacts to u¯, but with the exception that first it subtracts from o¯Í the ex-ante perceived bias: i.e.,
it uses o¯Í−π0 instead of o¯Í. So if the individual believes that the bias is b0 = −10, then she should
react to the information u¯ = 10% in the same way that it reacts to o¯Í = 20%. There is, however, a
small difference. If the precision of unofficial and official statistics were similar, 1
σ2u
= 1
σ2o
, she would
still put more weight to u¯ than to (o¯Í − b0). The reason is that ω1 > ω2 (see Appendix for details)
because, when doing the correction o¯Í − b0, the individual is using b0, which has some uncertainty
of its own.
Lastly, the existence of a bias affects the variance of posterior belief π1 , but the level of the
bias b0 is not important. That is, the certainty of the individual about the inflation rate does not
depend on the perceived magnitude of the government bias. This result depends crucially on the
assumption that individuals know that the government manipulates the information by adding or
subtracting a fixed number to the raw statistic (as we saw in the previous section, this might be
a good approximation for the case of Argentina). In practice, individuals may be uncertain about
the exact form in which the government manipulates the statistics. In that case, the existence of
a bias would lead to significantly less informed agents.9
3.2 Experimental Design
The survey experiment in this section is related to a group of recent studies on how individuals
learn about inflation and how they form their inflation expectations (e.g., Roos and Schmidt, 2012;
Armantier et al., 2012a; Cavallo et al., 2014). Our survey was conducted online. We first collect
9For example, the government may be scaling down the true statistics by a certain factor, or they may be
doing something more pervasive thus making more difficult to extract useful information from the official statistics.
Individuals may use the co-evolution of official and unofficial statistics to learn which is the most accurate model
for the government-induced “bias” from manipulation. Adding uncertainty about the model of the bias would add
extra parameters that the individual should learn from, thereby decreasing the individual’s certainty about the
inflation rate. In the extreme case, if the government reports a statistic that is purely noise (i.e., orthogonal to the
raw estimate before the manipulation), then the individual will simply choose to ignore official statistics altogether.
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some background information about respondents, and we then randomly assign the subjects to
different groups that are provided different information related to inflation (subjects in the control
group receive no information).
The informational treatments consist of information about inflation rates for the previous 12
months (levels of 10%, 20% and 30%) according to different official and unofficial sources. We
cross-randomize the three inflation levels and the two sources of information in a non-deceptive
way, resulting in six different treatment groups and the control group.
After providing the information, we elicit subjects’ perceptions about current inflation levels
(i.e. their perception about the annual inflation rate over the previous 12 months), and their
inflation expectations (i.e. what they expect about inflation for the following 12 months). This
allows us to measure how a particular signal about inflation affects the distribution of inflation
perceptions and expectations. We also include a question about the respondents’ own subjective
assessment about their confidence on their answers, measured in a 1 (“Not at all sure”) to 4 (“Very
sure”) scale. The source of information and the level of inflation were the only variation between
treatment groups (those in the control group were not presented with any additional information).
We use three official sources of inflation for the treatments. The first one is INDEC’s CPI,
the most widely quoted and used official inflation statistic in the country. This was the main
indicator targeted by the government’s manipulation. At the time of our experiment, its annual
inflation rate was approximately 10% (we rounded all the inflation rates to integer numbers in the
experiment). Fortunately for our experiments, there were other indicators computed by INDEC’s
that reflected different inflation levels. One was the GDP deflator, which at the time of the
experiment was 20%. The GDP deflator was lower than the real inflation rate shown by unofficial
estimates, but the government could not allow it to be as low as the CPI (10%), because that
would have implied an implausibly high real GDP growth rate (over 15%). The GDP deflator is
not widely used as a measure of inflation, but before 2007 it closely tracked the CPI in Argentina.
The divergence after 2007 is additional evidence of the manipulation in the CPI.10 We also use a
third statistic compiled by INDEC and routinely used by local economists as an inflation proxy,
the rate of growth of nominal wages. At the time of our survey, this indicator was around 30% per
year (which the government advertised extensively to argue that real wages were increasing). The
information provided to the groups of subjects randomly selected to receive information from an
official source of statistics stated that, according to data from INDEC, the annual inflation rate
was about X%, where X was randomly chosen to be either 10, 20 or 30 (see the Appendix C for
the exact wording of these information treatments).
We also exploited the variation in the unofficial estimates seen in Figure 2, which in late 2012
ranged from 20% to 30%. A third unofficial index (not shown in Figure 2) was published by a
think tank with close ties with the government and had an inflation rate of about 10% at the time
of the experiment. Those people selected to receive information from unofficial sources were told
10See Cavallo (2013) for estimates of real GDP growth until 2011 using unofficial inflation statistics.
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that according to private estimates the annual inflation rate was about X%, where X was randomly
chosen to be either 10, 20 or 30 (exact wording in the Appendix).
When eliciting inflation perceptions and expectations, we state our question using the word
“inflation”, instead of referring to “prices in general” or other indirect references to inflation, as is
commonly done in the United States and other developed countries.11 As discussed in the previous
section, Argentina’s economic history implies that the general public is well aware of inflation,
which is discussed routinely in the media.12 Similarly, our question about inflation expectations
was: “What do you think will be the annual inflation rate for the following 12 months?” (see
Appendix C for more details about the questionnaire and wording). Finally, we did not provide
any incentives for respondents to answer accurately, such as prizes for guessing the right figures,
since as shown by Armantier et al. (2012) in the context of similar studies, there is a significant
correlation between incentivized and non-incentivized responses on inflation expectations.
We emphasize that we did not deceive the experimental subjects: we only conveyed information
that was actually circulating in the public discussion in Argentina, and we did not claim that the
information provided was true or false, nor did we endorse or disavow implicitly or explicitly any
of the sources. We merely stated that according to a given source, the level of annual inflation
was estimated to be X%. In any case, since some of this information corresponded to manipulated
statistics, and individual’s judgment about the information could vary depending on the source,
we included a debriefing at the end of the questionnaire. In this debriefing statement, we disclosed
that the information about inflation that we provided was randomly selected from six possible
messages, with the detailed source and explanation for each of those messages. We presented the
same debriefing statement to all subjects, irrespective of the treatment group to which they were
assigned. Our purpose was that the subjects should leave the experiment with more and better
information than what they had at the beginning of the experiment.
A small but not negligible number of individuals abandoned the questionnaire after the infor-
mation treatment and the question on inflation perceptions, and before reporting their inflation
expectations (105 out of 3,243, or 3.23% of the original sample). While this type of attrition
occurred also in previous rounds of the opinion poll (for instance, dropout of 5.8% of the sample
for the June 2012 round), in this case this might be a concern if the attrition was due to (and
correlated to) the information treatments, since this could introduce biases in the experiment and
complicate the interpretation of the treatment effects. For instance, government supporters who
believe that inflation is low may have abandoned the experiment because they did not like to see
11For instance, the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers elicits inflation expectations by means of the
following questions: “During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, or go down, or stay
where they are now?” with three options: “Go up,” “Stay the same” and “Go down,” and then asks “By about
what percent do you expect prices to change, on average, during the next 12 months?” with an open numerical
answer.
12Moreover, the previous rounds of the online opinion poll into which we built our survey experiment used the
wording in terms of inflation, as did other sources for inflation expectations, such as the Encuesta de Expectativas
de Inflación from the Centro de Investigación en Finanzas, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
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information from unofficial sources reporting high inflation levels (the opposite situation could
arise with respondents opposed to the government and with high inflation perceptions). Attrition
rates ranged from 2.7% to 4.1% for the different treatment groups, with 3.5% for the control group.
We test for selective attrition, and we cannot accept the null of differential attrition by treatment
group (p-value: 0.79). In unreported results, we tried models that correct for selective attrition
among treatment groups, for example estimating bounds (Lee, 2009). However, the attrition rates
were so low that the bounds are very similar to the uncorrected point estimates.
3.3 Subject Pool and Experimental Results
The sample is based on an established public opinion research firm that carries out a quarterly
online survey of adults in Argentina with the same set of basic questions since 2011. The exper-
iments were conducted on December of 2012. We slightly modified the standard format of this
public opinion survey to fit our experimental design. In particular, our survey experiment was
included early in the questionnaire’s flow, after which it continued with the usual set of questions
about politics, politicians and public affairs. These questions are not used as outcomes in our
analysis, although we use some of them for descriptive purposes and to verify the balance between
treatment groups. The respondents were assigned to the control group with a probability of 22.6%,
and to each of the treatment groups with a probability of 12.9%. The final sample on which the
following analysis is based consists of all the respondents that completed the questions on inflation
perceptions and inflation expectations, yielding a final sample of 3,138 observations.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics about the demographics of the sample, along with
the corresponding indicators for the general population. This sample is not representative of the
Argentine general population: while it is roughly similar in terms of age and gender composition,
our sample is substantially more educated (and richer) than average. Nevertheless, the qualitative
results are similar if we re-weight the observations to match the distribution of characteristics at
the national level (not reported).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Opinion Poll Experiment Sample Characteristics Compared to
Argentina’s Population
Proportion Age (20+) Greater College Voted C.F.
of Women Buenos Aires Degree Kirchner
Online Experiment Sample 57% 41.1 67.7% 60.7% 24.2%
Argentina’s Average 52.8% 44.9 36.3% 15.6% 54.1%
(20 years old or older)
Notes: Source: First row (Online Experiment Sample): opinion poll carried out in December 2012
(N=3138). Second row (Argentine Average): computed from the Encuesta Anual de Hogares Ur-
banos, 2012 (INDEC), except for the “Voted C. F. Kirchner” variable, obtained from the 2011
presidential election results. All statistics are based on individuals aged 20 or older in the corre-
sponding samples. “Proportion of Women” is the percentage of women in each sample. “Age” is
average age in years. “Greater Buenos Aires” represents the percentage of those living in the Greater
Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area. “College Degree” represents the proportion of respondents who
have a college degree or completed tertiary education. “Voted C. F. Kirchner” is the percentage who
reported to have voted for Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis, including pre-
and post-treament variables, for the control group and for each of the treatment groups. The
last column reports the p-value of a test in which the null is that the mean of each variable is
equal in all seven experimental groups. As expected, these tests are not rejected for any of the
pre-treatment variables, suggesting that the randomization was indeed balanced.
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Table 2: Average pre- and post-treatment responses by treatment group
Control Official10%
Official
20%
Official
30%
Unofficial
10%
Unofficial
20%
Unofficial
30% P-value
Post-Treatment
πi,t 28.31 28.55 33.58 42.10 26.37 28.89 34.78 <0.01
(0.591) (0.812) (0.809) (0.815) (0.805) (0.809) (0.816)
Standard Deviation of πi,t 15.89 13.94 16.01 19.43 14.36 14.55 18.57 <0.01
(0.911) (1.128) (1.098) (0.970) (1.207) (1.193) (1.130)
Confidence in πi,t 3.288 3.456 3.350 3.272 3.364 3.428 3.435 <0.01
(0.0256) (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0354) (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0354)
πi,t+1 28.20 28.22 33.32 39.24 26.29 28.62 33.99 <0.01
(0.595) (0.817) (0.814) (0.820) (0.810) (0.814) (0.821)
Pre-Treatment
Proportion of Women 0.560 0.539 0.563 0.586 0.601 0.545 0.608 0
(0.0181) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0250)
Age 41.11 41.06 40.64 40.79 40.93 41.37 41.16 0.97
(0.390) (0.536) (0.534) (0.538) (0.532) (0.534) (0.539)
College Degree 0.633 0.610 0.650 0.581 0.572 0.600 0.578 0.12
(0.0178) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0246)
Own Economic Situation OK 0.261 0.237 0.228 0.203 0.233 0.257 0.211 0.26
(0.0155) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0214)
Observations 750 397 400 394 404 400 393
Notes: Each cell represents the mean of each of the row variables for the corresponding control and treatment groups (in columns). The
standard errors of these means are reported in parentheses below. The standard errors for the standard deviation of inflation perceptions
(σπi,t) are based on 2,500 replications for each of the groups. The last column reports the p-value of a balance test in which the null is
that the mean of each variable is equal between all seven experimental groups (the control group and the six treatment groups). πi,t
represents the respondent’s inflation perceptions for the previous twelve months. “Confidence in πi,t” represents the respondent’s own
confidence on her response to the perceptions question on a 1 to 4 scale (“Not confident at all” to “Very confident”). The standard
deviation of πi,t is the standard deviation of perceptions for each group. πi,t+1 represents the respondent’s inflation expectations for
the following twelve months. “Proportion of Women” is the percentage of women in each sample. “Age” is the average age in years.
“College Degree” represents the proportion of respondents who have a college degree or completed tertiary education. “Own Economic
Situation OK” is a variable equal to one for those who responded that their economic situation was better with respect to one year
earlier, and zero otherwise. Source: Online Experiment Sample (opinion poll carried out in Argentina in December 2012).
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The top panel shows the post-treatment variables. We have post-treatment data on both
inflation perceptions and expectations. The first row shows that the average perception of the
control group, at 28.31%, is very similar to the average perception of those that received an official
estimate of 10% and an unofficial signal of 20%. These were the levels of official and unofficial
inflation that people likely expected to see, given than the CPI had consistently been close to
10% for several years, and the unofficial indicators were hovering 20% from 2007 to 2012. Note,
however, that higher levels of official inflation and different levels of unofficial inflation significantly
change the means. We discuss this impact in more detail below. The second row shows that the
standard deviation of inflation perceptions tends to rise with the level of inflation in the signal,
but mean confidence levels in the beliefs remain roughly the same in all informational treatments.
The fourth row provides the means for inflation expectations, which closely resemble the means
for inflation perceptions. Indeed, inflation perceptions are strongly correlated with expectations
in our surveys, as can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Past Inflation Perceptions and Future Inflation Expectations, Binned Scatter plot
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Notes: N=777. Source: Online Experiment Sample (see Section 3 below for details). This data is
for subjects in the control group, i.e., those who were not provided any information about inflation.
Our benchmark results in this section are based on inflation perceptions, which are directly
related to the information signals provided by the experiment (past 12 months data), but they are
equivalent to those that are obtained from inflation expectations, as we argue below.
The main experimental results are presented in two complementary ways. In Figure 5 we show
the distribution of inflation perceptions in the control group compared to that of each of the six
informational treatments. Figure 6 summarizes the effects of the six informational treatments on
the mean of various post-treatment outcomes relative to the control group.
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Figure 5: Histograms Comparing Distribution of Inflation Perceptions between Control and Treat-
ment Groups
a.1 Unofficial-10% vs Control b.1 Official-10% vs. Control
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a.3 Unofficial-30% vs. Control b.3 Official-30% vs. Control
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Notes: Observations: 750 in the control group, 397 in the Official-10% group, 400 in the Official-20% group, 394 in the Official-
30% group, 404 in the Unofficial-10% group, 400 in the Unofficial-20% group, and 393 in the Unofficial-30% group. Respondents
in the control group were not given any information about inflation statistics. Respondents in the Official-X% groups were
provided non-deceptive information about inflation estimates from official sources (either 10%, 20% or 30% in the previous year).
Respondents in the Unofficial-X% groups were provided non-deceptive information about inflation estimates from unofficial
sources (either 10%, 20% or 30% in the previous year). ES is the Epps–Singleton characteristic function test of equality of two
distributions (Goerg and Kaiser, 2009). The histograms are censored at 5% and 56% (inclusive), but these bins represent the
cumulative observations below 5% and above 56% respectively. Source: Online Experiment Sample (opinion poll carried out in
Argentina in December 2012).
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The first hypothesis to test is whether individuals reacted at all to the information we provided.
Relative to individuals who were told that inflation according to official statistics was 20%, individ-
uals who were told that official statistics was lower (10%) reported lower inflation perceptions, and
individuals who were told that official statistics indicated higher inflation (30%) reported higher
inflation perceptions. We conducted the Epps–Singleton (ES) two-sample test using the empirical
characteristic function, a version of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of equality of distributions valid
for discrete data (Goerg and Kaiser, 2009). According to the ES test of equality of distribution,
these two pairwise differences in distributions are statistically significant at the 1% level. These
differences are substantial, and economically significant: the mean of inflation perceptions is 28.5%
for the Official-10% group, 33.6% for the Official-20% group and 42.1% for the Official-30% group.
Second, we must assess whether this reaction to official statistics was naive. The naive model
would predict that households react to information on a given level of inflation from an official
source in the same way than they would to the same figure from unofficial sources. The data
strongly rejects this hypothesis: the ES test indicates that the difference between the distribu-
tion of inflation perceptions across individuals given messages Official-10% and Unofficial-10% is
significant at the 1% level; the same is true when comparing distribution of perceptions for the
Official-20% and Unofficial-20% groups, and for the Official-30% and Unofficial-30% groups. As in
the previous results, these differences are sizable and economically significant: the mean inflation
perceptions are 28.5% (Official-10%) and 26.4% (Unofficial-10%), 33.6% (Official-20%) and 28.9%
(Unofficial-20%), and 42.1% (Official-30%) and 34.8 (Unofficial-30%), respectively.
We can also use these results to test our rational learning model. A plausible heuristic for the
period under study is that official inflation rates were systematically 10 percentage points below
those from unofficial sources. Based on this approximation, the learning model predicts that indi-
viduals should react to information conveying an official inflation level of X% in the same way as
they would react to information from unofficial sources conveying a level of inflation of (X-10)%.
The results from our experiment are consistent with this hypothesis: we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the distribution of inflation perceptions are equal between individuals in the groups
Official 10% and Unofficial 20% (ES test p-value of 0.91), and we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the distribution of inflation perceptions are equal between individuals with messages Official
20% and Unofficial 30% (ES test p-value of 0.61). The differences in the mean of inflation per-
ceptions between the two distributions are also small and economically insignificant: only -0.34
percentage points between the Official 10% and Unofficial 20% groups, and -1.2 percentage points
between the Official 20% and Unofficial 30% groups.
The experiment also allows us to explore further the seemingly asymmetric reaction to actual
inflation suggested by the analysis of the non-experimental time series data on inflation levels and
expectations discussed in the previous sections. As shown in Figure 6, individuals who received
information from unofficial sources stating that inflation was 10% (Unofficial-10%) reported infla-
tion perceptions 2.51 percentage points lower (significant at the 5% level) than those who received
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information from similar sources but stating that inflation was 20% per year (Unofficial 20%).
Also relative to the latter group (Unofficial 20%), those who received instead information signaling
higher inflation levels (Unofficial 30%) reported inflation perceptions on average 5.89 percentage
points higher (significant at the 1% level). The difference between the absolute value of these
two effects is also statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.072), implying that
individuals were twice as reactive to information about higher inflation than to information about
lower inflation. The results are similar for those who received signals from official sources: inflation
perceptions are 5 percentage points lower in the Official-10% group than in the Official-20% group,
and they are 8.5 percentage points lower in the latter group compared to the Official-30% group.
The difference in the absolute value of these two effects is also statistically significant (p-value
of 0.082), and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the reaction to the higher signal is twice as
large as the reaction to the lower signal. This asymmetry in the experimental results in consis-
tent with the evidence in Section 2.3, where we compared the time series of inflation expectations
and unofficial inflation statistics. It suggests that the policy of manipulating official statistics was
counterproductive, making expectations flexible on the way up and sticky on the way down.
Figure 6 provides some additional insights. First, while we focused on the effects of our in-
formational treatments on inflation perceptions, panels a) and b) indicate very similar effects on
inflation expectations. This is consistent with the notion that individuals use their past inflation
perceptions to form their future expectations, as discussed in Cavallo et al. (2014). Second, the
results in Figure 6c indicate that several of the informational treatments substantially increased
the subjects’ reported confidence on their inflation perceptions. The difference between all treated
and control individuals is 0.095, significant at the 1% level, indicating that the information seems
to have been useful for the experimental subjects. However, the effect on confidence is almost
twice as large from unofficial sources (0.151 compared to 0.086, p-value of the difference 0.066),
suggesting that the information from unofficial sources was more useful than that from official
sources.
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Figure 6: Treatment Effects on Inflation Perceptions and Expectations
a. Mean Perceived Inflation (πi,t) b. Mean Expected Inflation (πi,t+1)
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Notes: Observations: 750 in the control group, 397 in the Official-10% group, 400 in the Official-20% group, 394 in the Official-30% group, 404 in the Unofficial-10% group, 400
in the Unofficial-20% group, and 393 in the Unofficial-30% group. Each bar represents the point estimate of the effect of the specific sub-treatment compared to the control
group. Robust standard errors reported. πi,t represents the respondent’s inflation perceptions for the previous twelve months. “Confidence in πi,t” represents the respondent’s
own confidence on her response to the perceptions question on a 1 to 4 scale (“Not confident at all” to “Very confident”), standardized by the control group’s mean and
standard deviation. πi,t+1 represents the respondent’s inflation expectations for the following twelve months. Source: Online Experiment Sample (opinion poll carried out in
Argentina in December 2012).
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4 The Price Controls of 2013
In Cavallo, Cruces and Perez-Truglia (2014) we show that individuals do not only form inflation
expectations from inflation statistics, but they also put significant weight on their perceptions
about prices of supermarket products. This implies that the government could try to manipulate
inflation expectations by changing the actual prices of salient products.
In February 2013, the government of Argentina significantly extended its policy of price con-
trols on retail products. These were “price agreements” with big companies and large supermarket
chains temporarily applied for hundreds of products in carefully selected categories. The govern-
ment targeted goods that had a significant weight in the CPI basket, and focused on brands and
retailers with large market shares. To enforce the price controls, the government publicly asked
its supporters to help monitor prices. The program was called “Precios Cuidados” (“Protected
Prices”). It was widely advertised and discussed in the media. While there were some problems
in the implementation, most of the goods included in the agreements were available for sale at the
agreed prices. This is visible in the unofficial inflation series from PriceStats depicted in Figure
3, which fell from an annual inflation rate of 25.8% in January 2013 to 17.7% in May 2013. The
Pricestats index draws its data mostly from large multi-channel retailers (which sell both online
and offline), where the governement was focusing its price control efforts.
The government apparently hoped that by controlling the prices for some key individual goods
it could have a stronger effect on inflation expectations. Indeed, the Finance Minister repeatedly
mentioned that the price controls were meant to “provide predictability to the economy”.13
Inflation levels did temporarily fall, but they had no impact on inflation expectations, which
remained stable near 30%. There are several possible explanations for this. One option is that peo-
ple knew the effect would be temporary, so expectations about future inflation were not impacted.
This probably played an important role, but we do not have a way to test it.
Another possibility is that even though people experienced more stable prices for some goods,
the information was not processed in the way the government was hoping for. To test this, we ran
a consumer-intercept survey in the front door of four branches of one of the largest supermarket
chains in the city of Buenos Aires, during the time of the price controls. The subject pool con-
sisted of supermarket customers who, having just made a purchase, were invited to participate in
a short survey for an academic study (about three to five minutes). Using hand-held scanners,
our interviewers scanned respondents’ receipt from the supermarket purchase, which contained
product identifiers that were matched to a database of scrapped online data from the same su-
permarket.14After scanning their receipts, respondents were asked about the prices changes they
thought the products they had just purchased had experienced in the previous year.
With these data we can distinguish the consumer’s perceived price changes of controlled and
13See for example http://www.economia.gob.ar/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/07-04-20142.pdf
14Prices were scraped from the websites of the supermarket by the Billion Prices Project at MIT. See Cavallo
(2013) for more details.
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non controlled products, and match the respondents’ perceptions with the actual price changes in
the same supermarket chain. Panel a in Figure 7 depicts the distribution of actual price changes
for products with controlled prices, and for those with no controls. The first results that emerges is
that products with controlled prices did have a substantially lower inflation rate – average change
of 1.9% compared to 21.7% for non-controlled products. However, panel b indicates that the
program was not effective in changing individual perceptions of price changes: the distribution of
remembered price changes (as reported by the respondents/consumers) are very similar for both
types of goods. Individuals clearly overstated the level of price changes for the controlled products,
even when the program was temporarily effective at moderating their price increases at the points
of purchase where we conducted our survey. It should be stressed that respondents were asked
about the prices of products they had just purchased, and not asked to guess aggregate price
changes or random products. The comparison between panels a) and b) shows a clear upward
bias in remembered price changes. Consumers not only failed to perceive a difference between
controlled and non-controlled goods, they were also too pessimistic remembering prices in both
cases.
Figure 7: Actual and Remembered Price Changes for Products with Government Controlled Prod-
uct Prices, Supermarket Survey
a. Actual price changes b. Remembered price changes
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Notes: The total number of observations is 1,140. Source: consumer intercept survey carried out by the
authors in June 2013 in four branches of one of the largest supermarket chains in the city of Buenos Aires.
Respondents to this survey were asked about the price changes with respect to a year earlier of products
they had just purchased at a supermarket (remembered price changes), and we matched those products with
their current and past prices of the same products in the same stores (actual price changes; see Section 4 and
Cavallo et al., 2014, for more details about the survey). Panel a presents the distribution of actual prices
changes from our database of historical supermarket prices. Panel b represents the remembered price changes
for the same products as reported by the respondents. The two figures present separate distributions for
products with prices controlled by the government and those with no price controls at the time of the survey.
See Section 4 for more details about the price controls.
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While the government’s underlying objective may have been to control the prices of some key
products in order to reduce inflation expectations, the evidence suggests that this strategy failed.
Perhaps people understand that their memories of prices are innacurate and choose not to use them
to form expectations, or perhaps they simply believe prices are rising faster because the government
is trying to convince them otherwise. In any case, just as it happens with the manipulation of the
aggregate official index, good-level price controls do not seem to be an effective way to influence
inflation expectations.
5 Conclusions
To understand how households learn from potentially-biased statistics, we exploit data from a
natural experiment and a survey experiment based on the period of government manipulation of
inflation statistics in Argentina. The evidence suggests that rather than ignoring biased statistics
or taking them at face value, households react as predicted by a model of Bayesian learner, by
de-biasing the official data to extract all its useful content. That is, in an environment with many
alternative inflation indicators and a great deal of attention to the topic, people are sophisticated
learners that can effectively process potentially-biased information. The government’s attempt to
manipulate the data, either through the aggregate price index or with targeted price controls, was
both inneffective and counterproductive.
These lessons are useful for understanding formation of inflation expectations in less extreme
contexts than Argentina, such as the United States and Europe, where experts may believe that
statistics are unbiased but households do not. For example, in Cavallo, Cruces and Perez-Truglia
(2014) we surveyed people in the US and found that 32% did not trust the official inflation data.
This group had inflation expectations that were signficantly higher than the rest. The average
inflation expectation for the group that did not trust the official statistics was 6.36 (s.e. 7.19),
compared to an average of 4.22 (s.e. 4.26) in the rest of the sample (we can reject the null of
equality in with a p-value of 0.001). Our current paper suggest that the difference could be driven
by the way people adjust for their perceived biases in the official data. One policy implication is
that governments should not only focus on providing information, but make efforts to reduce the
perception of a potential bias.
More empirical evidence is needed to understand how inflation and other expectations are
formed. Experimental results, in particular, can help the large theoretical literature that tries to
model the formation of expectations to determine whether people use adaptative, rational, natural
(Furster et al 2010), diagnostic (Bordalo et al 2015), or other types of expectations in different
settings. In particular, the evidence from Argentina suggests that perceived biases in the signals are
capable of creating assymetric responses in expectations. More work is needed to understand why
this happens and clarify the circumstances under which people tend to over-react and under-react
to information.
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A Appendix
A.1 Alternative Inflation Indicator in Argentina (2006-2015)
The Table below shows the main alternative inflation indicators available during the period 2006
and 2015 in Argentina. There are two main kinds of indices, public and private. The public indices
were produced by provincial statistical offices that are manged by local provincial governments.
Many of these provincial indices were discontinued over time after the federal government pressured
the local governments. Second, there were a large number private estimates produced by economic
consulting firms. Many of these consulting firms were fined in 2011 and could not longer publicly
release their data, but their information were used by members of the opposition in Government to
produce the “Congress Price Index” from 2011 to 2015. The longest lasting private statistic is the
daily index produced with online data by PriceStats, a firm co-founded by one of the authors of
this paper. See Cavallo & Rigobon (2016) for details on the use of online data to produce inflation
indices.
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Table 3: Argentina Alternative Inflation Statistics
Active Type of In-
stitution
Institution Area Frequency Public Start
Date
End
Date
Public
Start
Date
Public
End
Date
Numer of
Products
Fined by
Moreno
Data Source
No Private Inflacion Verdadera GBA Daily Yes Nov-
07
Aug-
12
Nov-
07
Aug-
12
450 Online Prices
Yes Private PriceStats National - Argentina Daily Yes Oct-
07
Today Mar-
11
Today 120,000 Online Prices
No Private Centro de Estudios Buenos
Aires City
GBA Monthly Yes Jul-08 Dec-
09
Apr-
09
Dec-
09
n/r*
Yes Private Elypsis National - Argentina Monthly Yes Apr-
13
Today Apr-
13
Today n/r Online Prices + Estimation
+ Survey
Yes Private Elypsis CABA Monthly Yes Apr-
13
Today Apr-
13
Today n/r Online Prices + Estimation
+ Survey
No Private Analytica CABA, GBA Monthly Yes Mar-
07
Mar-
10
Mar-
07
Mar-
10
n/r Survey (by the provinces)
Yes Private FIEL CABA Monthly No Jan-08 Today - - 3,500 Yes Survey + Online Prices
+ Receive information di-
rectly from retailers
n/r Private Ecolatina CABA, GBA Monthly No n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r Yes Survey
Yes Private Estudio Bein & Asociados GBA Monthly No Jan-08 Today Jan-08 Jun-
11
800 Yes Survey
Yes Private Abeceb GBA Monthly No Jan-07 Today - - 400 Yes Survey
n/r Private Economia y Regiones n/r Monthly No n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r Yes n/r
Yes Private Orlando J Ferreres & Asoci-
ados
n/r Monthly No Jan-07 Today - - n/r Yes Survey + Online Prices
Yes Private M&S Consultores CABA, GBA Monthly No Apr-
02
Today - - n/r Yes Survey + Receive informa-
tion directly from retailers
n/r Private Finsoport n/r Monthly n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r Yes n/r
n/r Private Rubinstein & Asociados GBA Monthly n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r Yes n/r
n/r Private Econviews n/r Monthly n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r Yes n/r
No Public Centro de Estudios para
el Desarrollo Argentino
(CENDA)
Jujuy, NeuquÃ c¥n, Entre
RÃos, Chubut, Salta, La
Pampa, RÃo Negro
Monthly Yes Oct-
06
Dec-
11
Oct-
06
Dec-
11
Survey (by the provinces)
Yes Public Direccion Provincial de Es-
tadistica y Censo - Neuquen
Neuquen Capital Monthly Yes Jan-80 Today Jan-80 Today Survey
Yes Public Gobierno de la Ciudad de
Buenos Aires
CABA Monthly Yes Feb-03 Today Feb-03 Today 628 Survey + Online Prices +
Phone Survey
No Public Sistema de Informacion So-
cioeconomica de Posadas
Posadas Monthly Yes Apr-
12
Apr-
12
Yes Public Direccion Provincial de Es-
tadistica y Censo - San Luis
Provincia de San Luis Monthly Yes Oct-
05
Today Oct-
05
Today 301 Survey
No Public Direccion Provincial de Es-
tadistica y Censo - Chubut
Trelew - Rawson Monthly Yes Jan-75 Dec-
13
Jan-75 Dec-
13
100 Survey
Yes Public Direccion Provincial de Es-
tadistica y Censo - Provin-
cia de Tierra del Fuego
Ushuaia y Rio Grande Monthly Yes Jul-13 Today Jul-13 Today Survey
No Public Direccion de Estadistica de
la Provincia de Tucuman
Monthly Yes Jan-68 Mar-
08
Jan-68 Mar-
08
Survey
No Public Direccion Provincial de Es-
tadistica y Censo - Jujuy
Monthly
No Public Gobierno de la Provincia de
Salta
Monthly
No Public Gobierno de la Provincia de
Chaco
Monthly
No Public Entre Rios Monthly
No Public Gobierno de Rio Negro Viedma Monthly
No Public La Pampa Santa Rosa Monthly
No Public Direccion Provincial de Es-
tadistica y Censo - Cata-
marca
Monthly
No Public us-
ing private
sources
Congreso Nacional Monthly Yes May-
11
Oct-
15
May-
11
Oct-
15
Private Consultants’ Esti-
mations
*No response
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A.2 Newspaper articles mentioning the inflation rate in 2007
Figure 8 replicates Figure 3 with the addition of the annual inflation rates mentioned by newspaper
articles on the topic published in “La Nacion” during the year 2007. Each dot in the figure is a
different article. A full list of all articles is included with the additional materials to this paper.
Figure 8: Newspapers Articles, Official Unofficial Statistics and Inflation Expectations
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Notes: The vertical line represents the start of the intervention of the national statistical agency (INDEC)
in January 2007. Each gray dot in 2007 represent the annual inflation rate mentioned in an article in La
Nacion Newspaper. “Official Inflation” is the annual inflation rate reported by INDEC. The “Unofficial
Inflation” indicator is computed by PriceStats (please see notes to Figure 2 for more details). The mean
of inflation expectations for the following 12 months are quarterly averages of the monthly series from the
Encuesta de Expectativas de Inflación (carried out since August 2006 by the Centro de Investigación en
Finanzas, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella). This survey collected information on the inflation expectations for
the following 12 months among the general population of Argentina, based on a standard question for this
type of survey (“What do you expect the annual rate of inflation will be during the next 12 months?”).
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B Model
B.1 Model Details
This section provides details for the model of Bayesian learning in presence of potentially-biased
statistics described in Section 3.1. In this model, the individual has two beliefs: one belief about
the inflation rate, π, and another belief about the government bias, b. The normality assumption
about the distribution of price changes determines that the conjugate distribution for beliefs about
inflation and bias is bi-variate normal:
Proposition 1. Let the prior belief about inflation and government bias be given by the bi-variate
normal distribution with mean
 π0
b0
 and variance-covariance matrix
 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
. Given the
signals u¯ and o¯Í, the posterior belief is distributed bi-variate normal, N (Υ,∆), with:
∆ =

 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
−1 +
 1 0
1 1
T  σ2u 0
0 σ2o
−1  1 0
1 1


−1
Υ = ∆

 1 0
1 1
T  σ2u 0
0 σ2o
−1  u¯
o¯Í
+
 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
−1  π0
b0


Proof. See B.2
The mean posterior beliefs are an average between the average prior beliefs,
 π0
b0
, and the
signals,
 u¯
o¯Í
, weighted by a weighting matrix that involves a combination of their respective
variance-covariance matrices. Focusing on the case where the prior beliefs for the inflation rate
and the bias are orthogonal, σπb,0 = 0, in which case the formulas simplify substantially. Focusing
on this case does not mean that we believe the assumption σπb,0 = 0 to hold.15 The intuition for
the case where σπb,0 Ó= 0 would be similar, only that the formula would include several additional
second-order terms that make corrections for the fact that the prior beliefs about π and b are
correlated. When σπb,0 = 0, the means of the posterior beliefs,
 π1
b1
, are equal to (see Appendix
B.3 for details):
π1 = (1− ω1 − ω2)π0 + ω1u¯+ ω2 (o¯Í − b0) (3)
b1 = (1− ψ1 − ψ2) b0 + ψ1 (o¯Í − π0) + ψ2 (o¯Í − u¯) , (4)
15Indeed, even if we started out with orthogonal beliefs a rational individual would still end up with a posterior
belief where σπb,0 Ó= 0.
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with ω1 =
1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2u
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2u
1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2u
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2o
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
, ω2 =
1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2u
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2o
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
,
ψ1 =
1
σ2π,0
1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2u
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2o
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
and ψ2 =
1
σ2u
1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2
b,0
1
σ2u
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2o
+ 1
σ2o
1
σ2
b,0
.
The mean posterior belief for the inflation rate, π1, is a weighted average between the mean
prior belief, π0, the unofficial inflation rate, u¯, and the bias-adjusted official statistics, o¯Í− b0. The
weights assigned to each of those three terms is increasing in the precision of the corresponding
term (e.g., the weight on π0 is increasing in 1σ2π,0 ). The mean posterior belief for the government
bias, b1, is a weighted average between the prior belief, b0, the gap between the official statistics
and the prior belief about inflation, o¯Í − π0, and the gap between the official statistics and the
unofficial statistics, o¯Í− u¯. Once again, each of those three terms is weighted by its corresponding
precision.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Bayes’ Theorem for Gaussian variables. This problem is a particular case of a more general prob-
lem of Bayesian learning with multivariate normal priors and multivariate signals, which produces
a posterior beliefs that is multivariate normal. This is known as Bayes’ Theorem for Gaussian
variables:
. Given a prior belief x and a signal y with distributions in the form
p (x) = N
1
µ,Λ−1
2
p (y|x) = N
1
Ax+ b, L−1
2
The posterior distribution for the signal is given
p (x| y) = N
1
∆
î
ATL (y − b) + Λµ
ï
,∆
2
where
∆ =
1
Λ + ATLA
2−1
See Bishop (2006), section 2.3.3, pages 90-94.
We can simply apply Theorem 1 using the following replacements:
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x =
 π
b
, µ =
 π0
b0
, y =
 u¯
o¯Í
, Λ−1 =
 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
,
A =
 1 0
1 1
, b = 0, L−1 =
 σ2u 0
0 σ2o
.
As stated by the proposition, this results in a posterior belief distributed bi-variate normal,
N (Υ,∆), with:
∆ =

 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
−1 +
 1 0
1 1
T  σ2u 0
0 σ2o
−1  1 0
1 1


−1
Υ = ∆

 1 0
1 1
T  σ2u 0
0 σ2o
−1  u¯
o¯Í
+
 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
−1  π0
b0


B.3 Derivation of equations 3 and 4
We can prove this proposition by replacing the orthogonality condition and finding the expected
values for π1 and b1. Therefore, we have:
E
 π1
b1
 =

 σ2π,0 σπb,0
σπb,0 σ
2
b,0
−1 +
 1 0
1 1
T  σ2u 0
0 σ2o
−1  1 0
1 1


−1

 1 0
1 1
T  σ2u 0
0 σ2o
−1 u¯
o¯Í
+
 σ2π,0 0
0 σ2b,0
−1 π0
b0


=

 1σ2π,0 0
0 1
σ2
b,0
+
 1 1
0 1
 1σ2u 0
0 1
σ2o
 1 0
1 1


−1

 1 1
0 1
 1σ2u 0
0 1
σ2o
 u¯
o¯Í
+
 1σ2π,0 0
0 1
σ2
b,0

 π0
b0


=

 1σ2π,0 0
0 1
σ2
b,0
+
 1σ2u + 1σ2o 1σ2o
1
σ2o
1
σ2o


−1
 u¯σ2u + o¯Íσ2o
o¯Í
σ2o
+
 π0σ2π,0
b0
σ2
b,0


= 1-------cov
 π1
b1
 ------
σπb,0=0
-------
 1σ2b,0 + 1σ2o − 1σ2o− 1
σ2o
1
σ2π,0
+ 1
σ2u
+ 1
σ2o


u¯
σ2u
+ o¯Í
σ2o
+ π0
σ2π,0
o¯Í
σ2o
+ b0
σ2
b,0

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Given the orthogonality condition, the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix is
-------cov
 π1
b1
 ------
σπb,0=0
------- =
1
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2
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2
o
+ 1
σ2uσ
2
b,0
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σ2uσ
2
o
+ 1
σ2oσ
2
b,0
Solving this product, we obtain:
E (π1) =
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3
1
σ2π,0σ
2
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2
o
4
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3
1
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2
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2
o
4
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2
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E (b1) =
b0
3
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2
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2
u
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2
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o
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Last, we define the following weights:
ω1 =
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σ2uσ
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+ 1
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2
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2
b,0
ϕ1 =
1
σ2oσ
2
P,0
1
σ2π,0σ
2
b,0
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o
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2
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o
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2
o
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2
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2
o
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2
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2
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After replacing for the weights, we obtain:
E (π1) = π0 (1− ω1 − ω2) + u¯ω1 + (o¯Í − b0)ω2
E (b1) = b0 (1− ϕ1 − ϕ2) + (o¯Í − π0)ϕ1 + (o¯Í − u0)ϕ2
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C Argentina Online Experiment Questionnaire - English
Translation
We include here English translations for the pre- and post-treatment questions, for all the in-
formational treatments and for a debriefing message for all respondents included at the end of
the questionnaire, which explained the use of alternative sources for the information treatments.
Answer options are presented in brackets. The original questionnaire in Spanish is available upon
request.
Pre-treatment questions:
• Please indicate your sex: [Female; Male]
• How old are you? [0, 1, 2, ..., 99]
• What is the highest education level you have attained? [Primary school dropout, Completed
primary school, High school dropout, Completed high school, Some tertiary education, Com-
pleted tertiary education, Some college, Completed college, Post-graduate]
• How do you think that your personal/family economic situation is with respect to one year
ago? [Better, Worse, Same, Don’t know]
• And how do you think your personal/family economic situation will be one year from now?
[Better, Worse, Same, Don’t know]
Randomized informational treatment:
• Control: no message.
• Official-10%: “According to official indicators published by INDEC, the annual inflation rate
with respect to a year ago was approximately 10%”.16
• Official-20%: “According to official indicators published by INDEC, the annual inflation rate
with respect to a year ago was approximately 20%”.
• Official-30%: “According to official indicators published by INDEC, the annual inflation rate
with respect to a year ago was approximately 30%”.
• Unofficial-10%: “According to one of the unofficial indicators published by consulting firms,
analysts and research centers, the annual inflation rate with respect to a year ago was ap-
proximately 10%.”
16INDEC stands for Argentina’s “Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos.” The acronym and the institution
it represents are well known in Argentina and were amply covered in media outlets at the time of the survey.
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• Unofficial-20%: “According to one of the unofficial indicators published by consulting firms,
analysts and research centers, the annual inflation rate with respect to a year ago was ap-
proximately 20%.”
• Unofficial-30%: “According to one of the unofficial indicators published by consulting firms,
analysts and research centers, the annual inflation rate with respect to a year ago was ap-
proximately 30%.”
Post-treatment questions:
• What do you think was the annual inflation rate with respect to one year ago? Please select
the value closer to your estimate from the following drop down menu. [0% or <, 1%, ...
100%; >100%]
• How certain are you about your answer to the previous question? [Very sure; Somehow sure,
Not very sure; Not sure at all]
• What do you think will be the annual inflation rate with respect to one year from now?
Please select the value closer to your estimate from the following drop down menu. [0% or
<, 1%, ... 100%; >100%]
Debriefing:
• “At some point during the questionnaire we asked about your inflation perceptions. We
provided some of the respondents an approximate estimate of the annual inflation rate with
respect to one year later. The provided estimate was randomly selected among one of the
following sources: INDEC’s official inflation indicator, private estimates of analysts close
to the government, implicit inflation (gross domestic product deflactor) from INDEC, an
estimate from a private research center (Universidad del CEMA), implicit inflation (wage
growth coefficient) from INDEC, or the estimate from a consulting firm (food and beverages
from Inflación Verdadera).”
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